How financial liberalization in Indonesia affected firms'capital structure and investment decisions by Harris, John R. et al.
Policy  Research  |  O
PAPERS'
Fnancial  Policy  and  Systems
Country  Economics  Department
The  World  Bank
October  1992
WPS 997
How Financial  Liberalization
in Indonesia  Affected  Firms'
Capital  Structure




Miranda  G. Siregar
Financial  reform  has had a significant  impact  on firms' real and
financial  choices  - helping  to reallocate  credit toward  smaller
firms and relaxing  the financial  constraints  they face.
Policy  Research  WotkingPapers  dissenmuate  the  findings  of  woik  in  ptogress  and  encouragethe  exchangeofideas  amengBank  staff  and
al othen iresed  indevelopmneissuea.Thesepapers,distuibutedbytheRe3earchAdvisory  Staffrcanythenamesoftieauthora,eflet
onoy  betrviews,and  shouldbeused  and  cited  Bcordinrlye.  fit diagipntrationsy  and  concl  trionsaethe.autom'owm.Theyshould

















































































































Financial  Policy  and  Systems
WPS  997
This paper-  a product  of the Financial  Policy  and Systems  Division,  Country  Economics  Department-
was  prepared  for the World  Bank research  project,  Investment  Decisions,  Capital  Market  Imperfections,
and the Effects  of Financial  Liberalization:  The Ecuadorian  and Indonesian  Cases (RPO  676-72).  Copies
of this paper  are  available  free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please
contact Wilai  Pitayatonakamn,  room N9-003,  extension  37664  (October  1992,42 pages).
How did financial  liberalization  affect Indone-  remain high and have  increased  substantially  for
sian firms? Harris,  SchiantareUi,  and Siregar  small and medium-size  exporting  establishments.
analyzed  real and financial  indicators  for the  For all groups,  higher rates  of financial  leverage
establishments  in their panel of Indonesian  gave  rise to extremely  high returns on owned
manufacturing  establishments  for 1981-88.  Their  equity.  Medium-size  firms  - both conglomerate
sample was not representative,  but their evidence  and nonconglomerate  - have had the highest
shows that economic  reform  had a favorable  rates  of return  to capital,  financial  leverage,  and
effect on the performance  of smaller firns.  returns  to equity.
Liberalization  helped reallocate  domestic  Financial  reform  has had a significant  impact
credit toward smaller firms  to a level roughly  on firms' real and financial  choices.  Shifting
proportionate  to their contribudon  to value-  from administrative  allocations  of credit to
added. Moreover,  other firms were successful  in  market-based  allocations  has increased  borrow-
replacing  expensive  domestic  credit with cheaper  ing costs,  particularly  for smaller  firms, but it has
foreign  credit, releasing  some domestic  credit to  also widened  access  to finance.  The net effect
establishments  that lacked access  to it.  appears  to have been a decrease in the degree of
market segmentation  and a relaxation  of finan-
Nominal  and real interest  rates rose  to very  cial constraints  to the benefit of investment
high levels, but real returns  to capital assets  activity.
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Since  1968  Indonesia  has  had a high rate  of growth  facilitated
considerably  by the  high oil  prices  in  the 70's  and  early  80's.  As an oil
exporter,  Indonesia  experienced  two  major  booms  during  1974-77  and 1979-82.
There  was clear  recognition  that  oil  revenues  were a temporary  blessing  and  so
the  overall  policy  was directed  to  channeling  this  money  into investment  in
order  to assure  sustained  growth  after  oil  becomes  depleted. Fostering  growth
in the  manufacturing  sector  was a central  goal  of government  policy  to  be
achieved  by channeling  money to the  private  industrial  sector  through  the
banking  system.  The banks  were instructed  to finance  at low interest  rates
certain  types  of investment,  particularly  in import  substitution  and  backward
integration  of  heavy industries,  during  the  boom periods.  With the:indeveloped
capital  market,  the financial  sector  was typically  repressed.
Following  sharp  declines  in  oil revenues  in late  1982,  and  again in 1986,
policy  makers  recognized  the  need for  major  reforms.  First,  non-oil  exports
had to be increased  in  order to  maintain  the flow  of imports  essential  for
continued  development.  Second,  with the  decline  in oil revenues,  fewer
resources  were now available  to the  public  sector  and therefore  it became
necessary  to stimulate  private  savings  mobilization.  An integral  part  of the
policy  reform  was the  deregulation  of the  banking  system  of June 1983 in  which
banks  were allowed  to set  interest  rates,  central-bank  liquidity  credits  were
reduced  substantially,  and administratively-determined  credit  ceilings  were
abolished.  The general  objective  was to move  away from administrative  control
to  market  allocation  of credit  flows.
When oil  prices  fell further  in 1986,  the  government  was again  forced  to
devalue  the  currency,  and  further  deregulation  measures  were taken.  The
continuing  evolution  of policy  towards  increased  market  orientation  reached
its  peak in 1988  in a series  of major  policy  reforms,  affecting  primarily  the
banking  system,  capital  markets,  fiscal  measures  and trade  policies. These
series  of reforms  have indeed  affected  the  real sector  significantly.  (Chant
and  Pangestu,  pp 1-5).
The  purpose  of this  paper is to assess  the  effects  of reforms,  in
particular  of the  financial  reforms,  on the  structure  and  behavior  of the
manufacturing  industries  in Indonesia.  How did  credit  allocation  change  with
financial  deregulation?  What  was the  impact  on firms'  investment  choices? Did
-1-the  effects  of reform  differ  across  firms?
We will  make use of data from  a panel  of the  manufacturing  establishments
in Indonesia  during  the  1981-1988  period.  The  paper  will be divided  into  four
sections.  Section  I contains  a macroeconomic  overview.  In section  II we
discuss  the structure  of manufacturing  industries  and the  determinants  of
access  to credit  markets.  In section  III  we describe  the  economic  and
financial  evolution  of establishments during  the 80's,  using  a balanced  panel
of 218  reporting  units.  Finally,  in section  IV  we present  some  preliminary
econometric  evidence  on the  effects  of financial  liberalization  on investment
and  borrowing  behavior. The  Appendix  contains  a detailed  description  of the
data construction  and cleaning  procedures  which  have been used.  In the
conclusion  we summarize  the  main findings.
1. MACROECONOMIC  AND POLICY  DEVELOPMENTS  IN INDONESIA:
1. THE MACROECONOMIC  BACKGROUND
The oil  boom  which  began  with  a quadrupling  of oil prices  in 1973  and
continued  with  high prices  until 1982,  had  profound  effects  on the Indonesian
economy.  Macroeconomic  policy  was fairly  sound  during  this  period,
characterized  by a concern  for  keeping  inflation  under control  and maintaining
a prudent  fiscal  policy.  A cautious  foreign-borrowing  policy,  following  the
infamous  Pertamina  affair  of the  mid 1970's,  kept the  country's  debt service
ratio  fairly  low  throughout  the  boom period,  (e.g.  in 1981,  the  ratio  of
public  debt  service  to exports  was only  9% and slowly  increased  to 18% in
1984).  The government  was actually  less  than  fully  successful  in  controlling
inflation  given  its inability  to sterilize  oil  revenues  with the limited
monetary  instruments,  and this  resulted  in  an inflation  rate of approximately
18%  by the  end of 1982.  At that  time  the  economy  was "overheated"  with high
levels  of oil-related  public  investments  and  an upsurge  in private  investments
being  accompanied  by more protectionist  and interventionist  policies.
Falling  oil prices  in 1983,  together  with world  wide recession  and  an
increase  in the  US real interest  rate,  worsened  Indonesia's  balance  of
payments,  thereby  impairing  its  ability  to service  debt.  The  Government
responded  by devaluing  the  Rupiah  by 50 per cent at the  end  of March 1983,
partly  for  btilgetary  reasons  so that  the  nominal  value  of government  revenues
would  continue  to show  an increase,  and  primarily  in order  to boost  non-oil
-2-exports.  Following  this  large  discrete  devaluation,  the foreign  exchange
regime  was changed  to  a crawling  peg system  in order  to reduce  volatile
expectations  of large  dollar  depreciatior.s  which induced  episodic  large  scale
capital  outflow.  (Chant  and Pangestu  (1992),  pp.38-9)  To reduce  both external
and internal  imbalances,  a series  of austerity  measures  were also introduced
which  included  budget  cuts,  postponement  of some capital  and import-intensive
projects,  reduction  of domestic  fuel subsidies,  and  reduction  of state
enterprise  and agricultural  subsidies. The government  also  moved quickly  in
its  efforts  to increase  the  mobilization  of domestic  resources  through  reforms
in the financial  sector  and  by improved  collection  of non-oil  tax revenues.
Prior  to June 1, 1983,  Indonesia  had most of the  characteristics  of a
financially  repressed  system.(Chant  and  Pangestu  (1992),  pp.6-8)  The  banking
sector  was  heavily  regulated  and  entry  was very restricted.  The  market  was
dominated  by State  banks,  where  Bank Indonesia  alone  accounted  for  35%  of the
total  assets  of all financial  systems,  and  the five  large  state  banks  held
another  40%.  Bank Indonesia  set  ceilings  on bank credits  for individual  banks
which  was the  principal  means of control  of monetary  expansion  because  it  was
believed  that  reserve  management  alone  was insufficient  given  the  volatility
of  international  financial  flows  via oil  revenues  and the  absence  of
restrictions  on private  capital  movements. Over time,  an extensive  selective
credit  system  with subsidized  interest  rates  was introduced.  Moreover,  Bank
Indonesia  provided  direct  lending  to some economic  units,  and channeled
substantial  amounts  of low-interest  liquidity  credits  to  high-priority or
'strategic'  sectors.  These  controls  and  credits  provided  the  Government  of
Indonesia  with  basic tools  for  channeling  oil earnings  to the  private  and
parastatal  sectors  in order  to increase  investment. When the  volume  of oil
revenues  fell  precipitously,  the  principal  task facing  the  financial  sector
changed  quickly  to  mobilization  of domestic  resources.
Together  with the  trade  and industrial  policies,  which  were  basically
protectionist  and  were  primarily  implemented  through  a detailed  licensing
system,  this  cheap  credit  policy  created  a few  dominant  economic  groups  or
'conglomerates'  in the  Indonesian  economy  which  prospered  because  of their
ability  to make  use of the  administrative  allocation  systems  (Robison  (1986)).
In addition  to  privileged  access  to the  domestic  credit  market,  these  groups
also  were able to make use  of offshore  loans  because  of their  extensive  links
with financial  and trading  networks  in Singapore,  Malaysia,  and  Hong Kong.
Entry  restrictions  via industrial  licensing,  receipt  of quotas  on imports
-3-and/or  being  g-anted  monopoly  importer  status,  and substantial  interest  rate
reductions  for  credits  to 'priority  sectors',  created  a number  of additional
distortions  that  generated  profits  for  the firms  (principally  conglomerates)
which  were able to obtain  pr' Aleged  access  to them.  In addition,  the  majority
of domestic  private  banks in Indonesia  have been acquired  by these
conglomerates  which  have  been able to  use the  banks to  rain access  to credit
for their  non-financial  operating  units  at prevailing  deposit  rates .
Efforts  to increase  the  mobilization  of domestic  funds  through  the
financial  sector  and improve  the  collection  of non-oil  tax  revenues  were
reflected  in significant  reforms  in the 1983  banking  deregulation  and in the
tax  reforms  of 1984.  The  principal  ob4ectives  of the  banking  deregulation  were
to provide  higher  returns  to depositors  and lower  costs to  borrowers  by
raising  the  degree  of competition  in the financial  markets;  to increase
savings  mobilization  through  the  banking  system;  to improve  the  efficiency  of
allocation  of financial  resources  through  increased  reliance  on the  market
mechanism;  and  to increase  the  use of capital  market  instruments  to raise
equity  capital  and enhance  the liquidity  of shares.
The  measures  taken  included  the  abolition  of credit  ceilings,  a
reduction  in liquidity  credits,  and the  granting  of permission  for  state
banks to set  their  own  interest  rates  on deposits  and loans.  Each of these
measures  required  drastic  changes  in bank  behavior  and in the techniques  of
liquidity  management.  All  banks  were subjected  to  much greater  competition  and
became  responsible  for  acting  on their  independent  assessments  of profitable
opportunities. Although  the  immediate  effects  of the  1983  banking  reforms
were to substantially  increase  interest  rates  paid on deposits  and  charged  for
loans,  and to increase  the share  of GDP  being  channeled  through  the formal
financial  system,  the  anticipated  changes  in  competitive  behavior  emerged  only
slowly  and  were really  given  impetus  with the later  round  of reforms  in 1988
and  1989. (Chant  and Pangestu,  (1992)  pp. 8-26)
The  banking  deregulation  was followed  by the  Tax  Reform  aimed  at
improving  collection  of tax  revenues  from  non-oil  sources.  This reform was
undertaken  in  stages  beginning  in 1984  with the  abolition  of the  withholding
tax  and the introduction  of the  value-added  tax.  Subsequently  income  and  sales
taxes  were rationalized.  These  reforms  were not followed  by analogous  changes
in trade  and industrial  policies,  which  were not liberalized  but became  even
more protectionist,  so that  by the  beginning  of 1985  more than 1100  products
had  been placed  under  import  license,  import  bans, or quotas.  The  worst thing
-4-was that  it enhanced  further  the  dominant  positions  of the  major  conglomerate
groups  which  had  already  benefited  enormously  by the  easy credit-allocation
policies.
The fall  of oil  prices  from  US$ 28  per barrel  to  US $  9 per  barrel  by
August  1986  forced  the  government  to  again  carry  out  a maxi deval ition  of the
currency  by 45% (from  Rp. 1134  per US$ to  Rp. 1644  per  US$) in  September  1986
in order  to improve  the  country's  balance  of payments.  The  plummeting  oil  and
primary  commodity  prices  shocked  the  government  and induced  it to  accelerate
the introduction  of reforms.  It  moved  promptly  by implementing  a series  of
tariff  reforms;  removing  most import  licenses;  reorganizing  custom,  ports  and
shipping  operations;  and introducing  a duty-draw-back  scheme  designed  to
provide  internationally-priced  inputs  to non-oil  exporters.  In 1987,  a
deregulation  package  was adopted  to attract  more foreign  investment  by
removing  various  measures  of discrimination  vis a vis domestic  investors  and
providing  better  and  more attractive  incentives  to foreign  investment.
This new attitude  towards  free  market  policies  reached  its  peak when the
government  announced  a package  of banking  and capital-market  deregulation  in
1988.  The essential  part  of the  new  policies  were the  lowering  of entry
barriers  and  reducing  reserve  requirements.  Foreign  banks  were also allowed  to
open  branches  in cities  other  than  Jakarta.  The 1988  deregulation  is  very
important  and  probably  had  more profound  effects  on the  actual  functioning  of
financial  markets  than  did the  1983  measures.
However,  because  establishment  data for the  industrial  sector  are
presently  available  in suitable  form  only for the  period  1981-1988,  we will
concentrate  on the  changes  that  occured  in the  middle  of the  80's.  Although
we will refer  to 1981-84  as a "pre-deregulation"  period  under the  assumption
that  changes  instituted  late in 1983  had insufficient  time to  affect  real
investment  decisions  until  well into  1984,  and 1985-88  as a "post-
deregulation"  period,  this  dichotimization  suggests  a once-for-all  regime
shift  that  considerably  exaggerates  the  reality.  Rather,  there  was a fairly
continuous  process  of deregulation  of various  aspects  of the  economy  after  mid
1983.  Furthermore,  the  response  of economic  agents  to these  reforms  took  place
fairly  gradually. Nevertheless,  for  our  purposes,  the  1983 reforms  were
extremely  significant  for increasing  the levels  of real interest  rates,  and
reducing  the  credit  controls  placed  on individual  banks.  The  dominant  State
Banks  were forced  to  act more  autonomously  and to  base their  lending  decisions
more on commercial  criteria  than  had  beeh the  case before  the  reforms.
-5-2. THE  1983 BANKING  DEREGULATION.
Following  the 1983  banking  deregulation,  interest  rates  on deposits  at the
state  banks  almost  doubled,  to levels  closer  to those  of private  banks.  For
example,  the  average  interest  rate on 6-month  time deposits  at state  banks
doubled  from  6% per annum  in  March 1983 to 11.5%  one month  later,  whereas
private  banks  increased  their  deposit  rate from 18.3%  to 20.0% . As a result,
rupiah  time  deposits  grew  rapidly  by nearly  75% in 1984  and  by another  413%  in
1985,  although  the  maturity  structure  became  shorter  (12  months  or less).
Consequently,  the  banking  industry  had to adjust  its  lending  rates,  and  as a
result  of the  increasing  share  of short-term  fixed-rate  liabilities,  they
became  more cautious  in their  credit  policies.  It was  widely  believed  that  the
high cost of intermediation  and the  high credit  risk  of the financial  system
caused  an unusually  large  spread  between lending  and  deposit  rates.-lIasution
(1986)  calculated  that,  after  deregulation,  the  weighted  average  cost  of funds
at state  banks  was in the  range  of 10-13%  while  the  prime lending  rate  was
around  18%.  He concluded  that the inefficiencies  of the  dominant  stace  banks
were also the  main reason  why competition  had not lowered  the interest-rate
spreads  and  narrowed  the  real interest-rate  differentials  between  domestic  and
international  markets  following  the  deregulation.  It should  also  be noted  that
before  the  1983  deregulation,  the bulk  of state-bank  credits  carried  an
average  nominal  interest-rate  of less than  13% (supported  by the low interest
liquidity  credits  from the  central-bank),  whereas  national  and  foreign  private
banks  charged  at least  21%  per annum,  reflecting  a significant  segmentation  in
the  credit  markets  (Woo  and  Nasution  (1989)).  On the  other  hand, Chant  and
Pangestu  (1992)  p 13)  suggest  a somewhat  different  account. They argue  that
"the  Indonesian  financial  reforms ...  succeeded  in narrowing  the  margins
between  the  interest  revenues  and interest  costs  of the Indonesian  banks.
this  evidence  offers  support  for  the  view that financial  reforms  that
eliminate  administered  interest-rates  and credit  ceilings  can improve  the
efficiency  of the  banking  system."
Following  the  reforms  of 1983,  particularly  the  relaxarion  of credit-
allocation  ceilings  to individual  banks,  the  share  of loans  provided  by the
state-banks  fell  as did that  of Foreign  Banks  while Private  Domestic  Banks
expanded  relatively. These shares  are shown  in  Table 1.
Table  2 displays  the increase  in  nominal  and  real interest-rates
following  deregulation.  The average  nominal  lending  rate increased  from  about
-6-9% in  1982 to about  22.5%  in 1988,  whereas  the  associated  real lending  rates
increased  from  -1.62 in 1982  to 10.97  by the  end  of 1988.  The abrubpt
increases  in these  rates  in 1984 and  1985 are  particularly  evident.
TABLE 1: SHARE  OF CREDIT  PROVIDED,  BY TYPE OF BANK
Y e a r  State-banks  Private  Banks  Foreign  Banks
1981  0.87  0.08  0.05
1982  0.87  0.08  0.05
1983  0.85  0.10  0.05
1984  0.81  0.13  0.06
1985  0.78  0.17  0.05
1986  0.75  0.20  0.05
1987  0.75  0.21  0.04
1988  0.72  0.24  0.04
Source:  Bank  Indonesia  weekly report, 1980-  1989
Note: The figures reflect the lending to private sector including  state enterprises,  but not
including  lending  to government.
TABLE  2: NOMINAL AND REAL LENDING  RATES
1981  - 1988 (in percent  per  year)
Nominal  Inflation  Real
Y e  a r  lending  rate  rate  lending  rate
(i)  (X)  (r)
1981  9.00  9.50  - 0.46
1982  9.00  10.80  - 1.62
1983  11.00  12.40  - 0.36
1984  15.00  8.80  5.70
1985  19.00  6.60  11.69
1986  21.00  7.80  12.83
1987  21.70  9.20  12.08
1988  22.40  10.30  10.97
Source: Various  Issues  of Bank Indonesia  weekly report.  and state & private banks annual  report.
It  is  obvious  that,  with  the  inflation  rate  remaining  Lt.ble  while
nominal  interest-rates  increased  sharply after  liberalization,  real interest-
rates  changed  from  negative  to  high  positive  rates  very  quickly. 1
1The  nominal  lending  rate  reported  is the  state  banks'  average  lending
rate.  The average  lending  rate  of all In,donesian  banks  will push the  rate
slightly  higher,  but  will  not change  the trend.
-7-It remains  a puzzle  how Indonesian  real interest-rates  could  remain  so
far  below comparable  rates  in Singapore  and  Hong Kong given  the  absence  of
restrictions  on private  capital  movements  since 1967.  Clearly,  during  the
pre-deregulation  period,  Indonesian  credit  was a relative  (absolute)  bargain
for  those  borrowers  graated  access  to loans. Of cou.se,  that is another
reason  why Bank Indonesia  had to control  the levels  of lending  under that
regime  since  there  must  have been substartial  excess  demand.  In the absence
of such controls,  one  would  expect  interest-rate  parity  to apply  between
Indonesian  and off-shore  borrowing  costs.  Table  3 converts  the  costs  of
borrowing  US Dollars  abroad  into  equivalent  Rupiah  costs  which take  account  of
depreciation  of the  Rupiah  against  the  US Dollar,  thereby  increasing  the
Rupiah  costs  of repayment.  As far  as foreign  loans  are  concerned,  the 1983  and
1986  devaluations  resulted  in a substantial  increase  in the  effective  cost of
foreign  loans,  as shown  in the final  column  of Table  3. These  rates"should  be
compared  with the  nominal  Rupiah  rates (i)  shown  in column  2 of Table  2.
TABLE  3:  EFFECTIVE  COST  OF FOREIGN  LOANS
6  month  % change  of U$  Effective  cost of
YEAR  LIBOR  rate  exch.  rate  foreign  loan (%)
(i,)  (6)  (rw)
1981  16.72  0.28  17.00
1982  13.60  4.68  18.28
1983  9.93  41.48  51.41
1984  11.29  7.74  19.03
1985  8.64  5.42  14.06
1986  6.25  46.4  52.65
1987  7.93  0.03  7.96
1988  9.43  4.0  13.43
1989  8.31  4.48  12.79
Note :- 6 is the ex-post exchange  rate depreciation  at the end ot calendar  year,  and was chosen due  to the
non-existence  of the forward exchange  rate market in Indonesia.
- Libor  (London  inter bank offer rate) was chosen  because  it was extensivelv  used  as a
benchmark  in most foreign loan agreement.
Indonesian  nominal  interest-rates  have risen  sharply  over the  period
while international  nominal  rates  have declined. It is  evident  that,
through  1985,  the  relatively  low  nominal  interest-rates  in Indonesia
-8-combined  with substantial  levels  of devaluation,  made domestic  borrowing
attractive  relative  to borrowing  from  abroad. This changed  in 1985,
although  the  maxi devaluation  in 1986  again temporarily  changed  the
situation. However,  by 1988,  adjusted  foreign-borrowing  rates  were
considerably  lower  than in Indonesia  and this trend  has accelerated  since
1989.  Thus, an effect  of the  deregulation  has been to increase  the
advantages  that  can  boŽ  obtained  by firms  with access  to offshore
borrowing  which,  of course,  are  primarily  the conglomerate  units  and
foreign  firms. The advantage  of  borrowing  from  abroad  is particularly
clear  for  exporters  whose revenue  is in foreign  exchange. This  has
raised  a  hotly-debated  issue  in Indonesia  of whether  the reforms  that
have increased  interest-rates  have served  to  help or to disadvantage
smaller  and  non-conglomerate  firms  which  have less  access  to "cheap"
offshore  borrowing.
11.  INDONESIA'S MANUFACTURING FIRMS AND THEIR ACCESS TO CREDIT
MARKETS
Indonesian  manufacturing  has grown  remarkably  since  the  early
1970's,  maintaining  real growth  rates  of value-added  in excess  of 12
percent  per annum. The best  description  of the  changing  structure  of
firms,  by sector,  size,  and  ownership  is  provided  by Hill (1990,a,b). At
the  same  time,  Indonesian  credit  markets  have been highly  segmented,  and
different  kinds  of Indonesian  firms  have  very different  access  to
capital.  The  ability  to  obtain  external  funds  in domestic  credit  markets
differs  between  small  and large  firms,  between  Chinese  and  Non-Chinese
firms,  between  private  and  public  enterprises,  between  firms  affiliated
or owned  by a group  and independent  firms,  and  between  export-oriented
and domestic-oriented  firms.  Moreover  the lack  of exchange-rate  controls
makes it  possible  for  those  firms  which  have established  good  reputations
and close  connections  with the  outside  world to  borrow  money from
offshore.
Since  Indonesia  has adopted  a flexible-exchange-rate  system,  foreign
exchange  risk is  an important  consideration  for those  who want to make
use of this opportunity,  especially  because  US-dollar-denominaced  loans
-9-usually  carry  a significantly  lower  nominal  interest-rate  than  domestic
loans  denominated  in rupiah.  Unlike  developed  countries,  there  are  no
organized  future  exchange-rate  markets  in Indonesia.  Instead,  the
central-bank  does  offer  a swap  facility  so those  who have access  to  off-
shore  loans  can  hedge  the exchange  rate  risk by paying  a certain  margin.
When it  was introduced,  the  swap  facility  was very limited,  with terms
restricted  to a maximum  of six  months,  and  with the  option  for  privil-ged
groups  to have the facility  extended  once  or twice.  The financial
institutions  were free to set  the  premium  charged  to their  customers,  but
the  demand  kept increasing  due to exchange  rate  uncertainty. Since
October  1982  a margin  of 2%  was set  by the central-bank,  and  by February
1983  the  financial  institutions'  premium.was  between 5% and  6% while  the
Bank Indonesia  premium  was between  4.25%  and 4.75%.
With the  average  interest  on rupia' oans near 22 percent^per  year,
the  swap  facility  made offshore  borrowing  cheaper  and highly  demanded.
Established  Indonesian  firms  could  borrow  at Sibor  or Libor (Singapore  or
London  inter  bank offer  rate,  respectively)  plus 0.5 to 2.0  percent  risk
premium,  which resulted  in  nominal  loan  rates,  ranging  between  7.5  and 10
percent. Using the  swap facility  at Dremia  between  4.5% and 6%, the
implied  rupiah  interest-rate  on foreign  loans  was between  12 and 16
percent. As far  as exporters  were concerned,  borrowing  off-shore  was  a
source  of cheaper  funds,  even  without  the  swap facility,  because  their
dollar-denominated  export  revenue  could  protect  them from  exchange  rate
risk.  It is  worth noting  that  after  October  1988,  limits  on the  swap
facility  were removed,  its  term  was extended  up to 3 years,  but the
premium  was to be determined  by the  prevailing  difference  between  Sibor
and  domestic  rates,  thereby  reducing  its  attractiveness.
It is obvious  that  there  are significant  differences  among  firms  in
their  access  to foreign  loans.  Basically  the foreign  option  was open  to
conglomerates,  large  Chinese  firms  with connections  to the  Singapore  and
Hongkong  financial  markets,  to foreign  firms,  and to exporters  with
established  overseas  customer  relationships.
Access  to domestic  credit  also  differs  across  firms.  Although
there  were special  credit  schemes  for  small  scale industries  (KIK  &
KMKP),  they  represented  only a  very small  part of the total  implicitly
subsidized  credit  from  State  Banks,  as shown in  Table  4.
-10-Indeed,  the  bulk of State  Bank  credit  extended  prior  to the 1983
reforms  went to the  larger  firms  who had the  political  connections,
influence,  and special  channels  to the  banks  due to their  longtime
relationships,  coupled  with their  ability  to provide  collateralizable
assets. Relatively  new (young)  independent  firms,  who had  not built  up
their  reputation  and  political  connections  faced  highly  constrained
access  ti  low-cost  credit.
TABLE 4: SMALL SCALE  CREDIT  AND PERMANENT  WORKING  CAPITAL
(As a percentage of state-banks total credit)
Y e a  r  Small  Scale  Credit  Permanent  Working  Total  Credit  to
Capital  Credit  Small  Industries
1981  0.05  0.09  0.14
1982  0.04  0.09  0.13
1983  0.03  0.07  0.10
1984  0.03  0.07  0.10
1985  0.02  0.06  0.08
1986  0.02  0.05  0.07
1987  0.01  0.04  0.05
1988  0.02  0.04  0.06
Source: Bank  Indonesia  weekly repon.verious  issues 1980-1989.
Many Chinese-owned  firms  have  close  links  with banks  and  financiers  in
Singapore  and  Hong  Kong which  allows  them  to borrow  at competitive  market  rates
using "reputation",  rather  than  collateralizable  assets,  as collateral.  While,
firms  owned  by indigenous  Indonesians  (pribumi)  generally  lack  access  to such
off-shore  credit,  many of the larger  ones  received  preferential  terms  from
state-owned  banks.  There  is insufficient  data to quantify  the  relative  share  of
ownership  held  by indigenous  persons  and those  of Chinese  origin,  but it is
widely  believed  in Indonesia  that  Chinese-owned  private  capital  had increasingly
aeveloped  its  dominance  of the  private  sector  during  the  period  of controls  and
has  been able to futher  capitalize  on its  established  base under  deregulation.
(Mackie  and Sjharir  (1989),  Soesastro  and  Drysdale  (1990).)
Firms  producing  goods  for  export  are.  also treated  differently.  Prior  to the
1983  banking  deregulation,  there  were generous  schemes  for  export  credits
carrying  highly  subsidized  interest-rates,  which  were extended  through  1989.  In
-1l-addition,  exporting  firms  found  it relatively  easy to borrow  either  offshore  or
domestically  in US-dollar-denominated  loans.  Since  their  revenue  was in US
dollars,  they  were relatively  insulated  from the risk  of exchange  rate
fluctuations.2
Private  firms  generally  differ  from  public  enterprises  with respect  to
access  to domestic  finance. Before  1983,  public  enterprises  had ready  access  to
funds  including  a whole  package  of incentives  such as increased  government
equity,  subsidized  interest-rates  on loans,  as  well as two-stage  loans  from
foreign  donors  carrying  a high grant  component. 3
As far  as private  firms  are concerned,  many Indonesian  Chinese  firms  and
some  of the  big Indonesian  firms  were affiliated  with, or belonged  to,
conglomerate  groups  which  combine  ownership  of manufacturing  establishments,
trading  companies,  and  banks.  Most interesting  from the  point  of view of this
study  is the  role these  groups  play in reducing  the financial  constraints  of the
member  firms. Establishments  owned  by a group  usually  receive  loans  on
favourable  terms  from  the  bank owned  by the  group in addition  to equity
financing  from  the  parent  company.  Certainly  this  close  relationship  not only
gives  ready  access  to finance  but also  mitigates  information  and incentive
problems  that  typically  arise in the  presence  of asymmetric  information.
It is  worth  noting  that  most of the  conglomerates  in Indonesia  belong  to
entrepreneurs  of Chinese  origin  and  have risen  to prominence  in industry  as a
result  of a complex  variety  of factors.  One  was (and  is)  the  company's
attractiveness  to foreign  manufacturers  as a reliable  and  efficient  domestic
partner  which  has given  rise to establishment  of numerous  joint-venture
subsidiaries.  But  corporate  efficiency  is  not the  only  reason  for  their
attractiveness  to foreign  partners. In addition  to satisfying  local-
participation  requirements,  that  were relaxed  partly  in 1986,  potential  local
2Although  Indonesian  banks  accepted  deposits  denominated  in  US$, they
were reluctant  to  make domestic  loans  in  US$ and generally  held corresponding
low-risk  foreign  assets. Their  reluctance  to lend in  US$ against  exporters
anticipated  revenues  is difficult  to understand  in relation  to  experience
elsewhere  with open capital  accounts  - Edwards  & Edwards  (1991)  analyze  the
Chilean  experience. However,  there  was considerable  change  after  1989  as
banks  became  more aggressively  competitive  but that  follows  the  period  being
analyzed  in this  paper.
3Two-step  loans  are extended  by donors  to the  Government  of Indonesia  for
the  purpose  of on-lending  for  specified  purposes  (e.g.  World Bank  loats  for
small-scale  industry  credits). A number  of such loans  were specifically
negotiated  for  expansion  of  public  enterprises.
-12-partners  must first  possess  the  capacity  to obtain  favotable  domestic
arrangements  such  as sole-agency  contracts  for  supply  to the government  or
monopoloy-importer  licenses  which  places  a premium  on political  connections  in  a
situation  in  which  access  to licenses  and contracts  are so important  (Robison,
1986).  The second  factor  has  been access  to finance. As suggested  above,  most
of the  Chinese-owned  conglomerates  were also  able to gain  access  to  networks  of
credit  which  extended  from  Hong Kong to Singapore  among  the  overseas  Chinese.
However,  one  should  not  neglect  the fact  that  once in a joint  venture  -
typically  with  big Japanese  firms,  and later  with Korean  and Taiwanese  firms,  -
finance  became  a lesser  problem.  Prior  to the 1983  deregulation,  the  magnitude
of the funds  mobilized  in this  way  was well  beyond  the  scope  of the
underdeveloped  domestic  capital-market.  The amount  of the  unswapped  foreign
loans  flowing  through  these  channels  far  exceeded  the  value loans  taking
advantage  of the  swap facility  provided  by the  central  bank.
Although,  small  independent  firms  frequently  find  themselves  rationed  out
of the formal  credit  market,  they  may still  have access  to other  more  costly
sources  of funds,  such  as suppliers  credit  and informal  'curb'  markets. Even  in
the  informal  markets  there  are significant  differences  in access.  For  example,
small  non-Chinese  firms  are likely  to face interest-rates  as high as 60%  per
year from  money  lenders,  while  small  Chinese-owned  firms  are more able to  borrow
from  informal credit markets in a transaction known as "bon-putih"  or literally
"a  piece  of  white  note-pad". These  carry  significantly  lower  rates  than  the
other  curb  market  rates  and  are secured  only  by reputation. In fact,  defaults
are rare in  this  market,  since  the  Chinese  business  community  is  very tightly
knit  and loss  of reputation  is a severe  punishment  and the threat  of boycott  is
a credible  enforcement  mechanism.
Summarizing,  there  are  profound  differences  among  Indonesian  firms  in terms
of their  access  to credit  markets. The differences  are  not only in loan
duration  and interest-rates,  but  also in  different  currencies  having  different
exchange  rate  sensitivities.  Some  of them (in  particular  small,  non-Chinese,
independent,  and  young firms)  are likely  also to face  severe  information
problems  and lack  of political  connections.  This limits  their  ability  to obtain
funds  from the  formal  credit  markets  (domestic  or foreign),  and forces  them
either  to rely  on internal  finance  or to raise  funds  from the informal  markets.
Other firms,  in particular  those  which  belong  to conglomerates,  large  Chinese
-13-firms,  joint  ventures  with foreigners,  and  public  enterprises  are likely  to  have
privileged  access  to the  domestic  credit  market  combined  with the ability  to
borrow  offshore.  The differential  access  to,  an:i  cost of,  external  finance  for
different  categories  of firms is likely  to  have a profound  effect  on their
investment  choices.
III. ECONOMIC  AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS:  EVIDENCE  FROM AN
INDONESIAN  PANEL  OF MANUFACTURING  ESTABLISHMENTS,  1981-1988
1. THE DATA AND SUMMARY  STATISTICS
In this  section  we will focus  on the  evolution  of the  real and financial
characteristics  of a panel  of Indonesian  establishments  for  the 1981 to 1988
period. 4 The  panel  has been constructed  by taking  advantage  of iniormation  from
two  main sources.  The first  source  is the  annual  survey  of manufacturing
establishments  conducted  by the  Central  Bureau  of Statistics  since 1975,
including  financial  data  available  only  after  1981.  The  second  source  is the
Census  of  Manufacturing  Industry  conducted  in 1986  which  contains  a measure  of
the  replacement  value  of the capital  stock  and a break  down  of sales  between
exports  and sales  in the  domestic  markets,  data  which  are not available  from  the
annual  surveys.
After  checking  for  the consistency  of the  data throughout  the  whole  sample
period,  deleting  establishments  that  have non-positive  capital  stock  or value-
added,  and omitting  outliers,  we ended  up with 1061  establishments  that  have at
4The fact  that  our  data are  based  on establishments  presents  a problem
that  we have been  unable  to overcome  fully. Most of the  analysis  of credit
market  segmentation  applies  to firms.  When firms  own  or control  multiple
establishments,  the  unit for  which debt  and interest  payments  is reported  is
arbitrary. This  certainly  applies  to the  establishment  which  we have
identified  as belonging  to conglomerate  groups. We believe  that  most of the
establishments  that  we identify  as non-conglomerate  are single  establishment
firms  and, if so, there  s'ould  be no confusion  on this  account.  However,  it
is possible  that  many are in fact  units  of family  enterprises  that  may also  be
engaged  in  non-manufacturing  activities. We have no way of controlling  for
this  possibility.
Another  feature  to  be kept in mind is that  our sample  is restricted  to
establishments  that  were in existence  prior  to 1981 and  which  experienced
steady  expansion. Thus  we fail to identify  financing  for  new start-up
establishments.  This may  be particularly  important  for  conglomerate  groups
which,  having  the  requisite  management  structure,  can readily  expand  via
creation  of new  establishments  as easily  as by expansion  of existing  ones.
-14-least  three  sequential  year  with positive  investment.  This preliminary  report
will be based  on a balanced  panel  of 218  establishments,  each of which  has
complete  data  and  positive  investment  levels  for  all eight  years.  Detailed
description  of the selections  of establishments  and  on the  methods  used for
construction  of variables  is  provided  in  Appendix  I.
The  key summary  statistics  for  our  balanced  sample  of 218 establishments
are  given  in Tables  5 through  10.5  These  tables  show the  data for  the  entire
sample  as well as for  sub-samples  chosen  according  to size  of the  firm,  status
(conglomerate  and  non-conglomerate),  and  market (export  or domestic). The size
sub-samples  were obtained  by classifying  firms  into three  categories  according
to the  number  of workers.  The establishment  is  classified  as small if the  number
of workers  at the  first  year of observation  was less  than 100,  medium  if the
number  of workers  was  between  100  and 500,  and large  if the  number  of  workers
was greater  than  500.6  Furthermore,  the  establishments  were also classified
into  conglomerate  and  non-conglomerate  categories. Establishments  that  belong
to a group  of firms  engaged  in  different  types  of activities  are  classified  as
conglomerates. The third  categorization  is  by whether  or not the  establishment
directly  exported  any  of its  outpuc  in 1985.
In order  to see the  effect  of the  1983 financial  liberalization  on
individual-establishment  behavior,  the  sample  period  was also  divided  into  two
sub-periods:  pre (1981-1984)  and  post (1985-1988)  liberalization.  The  year 1984
5These  summary  statistics  are  based  on  the  selected  sample  of  218
establishmerrts.  There  are  several  potential  problems  with  these  data that
arise  in  various  ways from  sample-selection  bias.  The most important
selection  criteria,  based  on econometric  requirements  for  estimation  using
balanced  panel  data,  was that  each of the  establishments  have  positive
investment  levels  in every  period. Thus,  establishments  with data only  for  a
subset  of the  years,  or  which  carried  out  no investment  in  some years,  are
entirely  excluded. There  is,  of course,  reason  to  believe  that  establishments
that  do not expand  in some  periods  are less  profitable,  or are  more
constrained  in access  to credit  than  are the  others. in other  analysis  we
have identified  that such  systematic  variation  exists. However,  the
comparable  summary  statistics  including  all 1,061  establishments,  do not tell
a substantively  different  story  and further  research  is in progress  that  uses
the  more complete  data set.  Therefore,  we prefer  to present  the summary  data
only for the  establishments  included  in the later  econometric  work reported  in
this  paper.
6We checked  the  change  in number  of  workers  for  each  establishments  over
the  sample  period,  and  found  that  only  a few  establishments  reduced  or
increased  their  number  of  workers  sufficiently  to  move them to a different
size  category.  Therefore  we decided  to  use the first-year  number  of workers
for  categorization.
-15-was  chosen  as a cut-off  to  allow  for the 1983  liberalization  to take  effect.  In
Tables  5 and 6  we report  the  investment  rates (I/K);  the  ratio  of gross  cash
flow  prior to taxes (gross  operating  surplus)  to capital  (S/K);  the  ratio  of
gross  profits (gross  operating  surplus  net of interest  payments)  relative  to
capital  (P/K);  the ratio  of gross  cash flow  to own equity  measured  as value  of
capital  stock  minus debt (S/EQ);  the leverage  ratio (D/K);  and the  output  to
capital  ratio (Y/K). We  also show  the ratio  between  interest  payments  and
total  debt (excluding  trade  debt)  as a measure  of the  average  cost  of borrowed
funds  for  each establishment.  The  variations  in this  ratio  should  reflect  in
part differential  access  to types  of external  finance.
TABLE 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS  FOR  FIRMS  DIVIDED BY SIZE & PERIOD
1981-1984 and 1985-1988
Number
Size  of  Period  I/K  S/K  P/K  S/Eq  D/K  i/D  Y/K
Firms
All Firms  218  81-84  0.098  0.416  0.519  0.775  0.463  0.171  1.534
85-88  0.099  0.497  0.593  0.969  0.483  0.192  1.993
Small  46  81-84  0.070  0.193  0.227  0.215  0.103  0.263  0.900
85-88  0.083  0.433  0.508  0.543  0.202  0.328  1.838
Medium  100  81-84  0.137  0.597  0.733  2.132  0.720  0.167  2.317
85-88  0.118  0.633  0.763  1.783  0.645  0.178  2.563
Large  72  81-84  0.063  0.307  0.343  0.463  0.337  0.093  0.853
85-88  0.065  0.350  0.410  0.623  0.438  0.125  1.300
S = operating  surplus (after interest, before  tax and depreciation)
K = capital stock (land,  building.  machineries,  equipments  & others), at replacement  value
P = operating  surplus before interest
Eq  =  capital stock minus debt
I = gross physical Investment
VA=  value-added
W =  total wage  bill
Y  =  total sales
i=  interest payment
D - stock of debt, not including  trade credit
-16-The  manufacturing  sector  in Indonesia  was  deeply  affected  by the 1983
deregulation  along  with the  other  structural  reforms  that  were gradually
implemented  afterwards.  The abolition  of credit  ceilings,  the  curtailment  of
liquidity  credits,  and  the  elimination  of  most interest-rate  controls,  had
different  effects  on establishments  depending  upon their  size  as shown  in  Table  5.
Overall,  the financial  reforms  appear  to have increased  both the  average
interest-rates  and leverage  ratios  of small  firms  quite  dramatically  and, to a
much smaller  extent,  for  the large  firms. Medium  firms,  which  were already
the  most highly  leveraged,  experienced  a small  increase  in interest-rates  and
decreased  levels  of leverage. As one  would  expect,  given  the institutional
structure  of Indonesian  manufacturing,  conditions  of access  to credit  vary
considerably  across  these  size  classes. The interest-rates  were  highest  for
small  firms  and lowest  for  large  firms  both pre and  post-liberalization,  but
the  spread  between  these  rates  increased  after  the  reforms. On the  other
hand,  the  small  firms  had the lowest  levels  of leverage  throughout  the  entire
period,  but the  differences  narrowed  after  the  reforms. At the  same  time,  the
rate  of investment  (I/K)  increased  for  the  small  firms  after  reform  while  it
fell  slightly  for  medium  firms  and rose  only  marginally  for the large  firms.
This picture  is not inconsistent  with one  of small  firms (less  well connected)
experiencing  increased  access  to credit  after  reforms  albeit  at  higher
interest-rates,  a result  predicted  by the  conventional  literature  on financial
repression  and reform.  (Fry,  1988,  Chs  12-17).
The  measure  of total  returns  to capital  (P/K)  show  a pre-liberalization
pattern  of highest  returns  for  medium  sized  firms  and  the lowest  returns  to
small  firms. After  the  reforms,  there  were dramatic  increases  in (P/K)  for
small  firms,  a modest  rise for  large  firms,  and  a small  decline  for  the  medium
firms. After  the changes,  the  medium-size  firms  continue  to  have the  highest
levels  of returns  but there  was convergence  among  these  rates  with small  firms
experiencing  rates  that,  on average,  surpassed  those  of large  firms. These
should  be thought  of as measures  of the  relative  productivity  of assets
employed. In  order to translate  these  measures  into  real rates  of return,
they  have to  be adjusted  for  corporate  taxes  paid and  real deprecition. Since
the  level  of effective  corporate  taxation  has been relatively  low,  and  real
depreciation  rates  are likely  to be fairly  similar  across  size  classes  of
firms,  the  patterns  of relative  returns  to  assets  appear  to  be fairly  robust
-17-to alternative  assumptions.7
Table  5 graphically  portrays  the  benefits  accruing  to firms  that  were
able to obtain  high leverage  through  debt.  The  measure  of return  to owned
assets  is S/EQ.  The numerator  of this  ratio  is gross  cash flow (operating
surplus)  which  is  measured  net  of interest  payments  (again  including
depreciation  and corporate  taxes). This is  profit  accruing  to firms  after
they  have serviced  debt  and is therefore  the  returns  to their  own  equity. The
denominator,  EQ is the  value  of the  capital  stock less  debt  which is the
definition  of own equity. Since  the  returns  to capital  are  all considerably
higher  than  interest-rates  (even  after  reforms),  the  most  highly  leveraged
establishments  appear  to be very profitable  indeed  which  accords  with
individual  entrepreneurs'  statements  that  they  consider  only  projects  with
payback  periods  of less  than two  and  a half  years.8  Note  particularly  the
increase  of S/EQ for  small  firms  from .22  to .54  after  liberalization  when
they  appear  to have  borrowed  substantially  larger  amounts  at substantially
higher  interest-rates.  The level  of S/EQ is extremely  high for  medium  firms
and  fell  marginally  from  2.13 to 1.78  which  was explained  primarily  by their
decline  in leverage  ratios. These  data suggest  that  access  to credit  is  more
important  for  previously-constrained  firms  than  are the interest-rate  levels
per se.  Also,  the increased  ratios  of S/K,  particularly  for small  firms,
demonstrates  that  the increased  rates  of profitability  substantially  increased
the  capacity  of firms  to  expand  investment  though  self  financing.
If the  sample  is divided  further  between  establishments  that  belong  to a
conglomerate  and those  that  do not, then  more striking  results  appear  in  Table  6.
None of the  small  establishments  belong  to conglomerates  so it is not  useful  to
try  to distinguish  among  them.  The pattern  of high profitability  and high leverage
among  medium  establishments  is  very similar  whether  or not the  establishments
are  members  of conglomerate  groups. However,  among  large  establishments,
there  are  striking  differences  between  conglomerate  and  non-conglomerate
7Accounting  measures  of depreciation,  which  are  available  only for  1985
need  bear little,  if  any, relationship  to real economic  depreciation. While
we have used  estimated  rates  of depreciation  in constructing  the  series  for
capital  (K),  there  is insufficient  systematic  differences  in capital  structure
across  establishment  categories  to modify  our  conclusions. In interpreting
(P/K)  ratios,  one  might  guess  real  depreciation  to  be in the  range  of 15-20
percent  and corporate  taxes  paid to be in the  range  of 0-15  percent.
8Interviews  by J. R. Harris  and  World  Bank Staff  with selected  industrial
establishments  in Jakarta  in  July 1988  and  by M. Siregar  in 1991.
-18-members.  The conglomerates  face lower  interest-rates  which  we conjecture  arose
partly  as a result  of preferential  access  to  priority  credits  in the  pre-
reform  period  and  partly  as a result  of  better  access  to cheaper  offshore
borrowing  in the later  period. They also have  much higher  rates  of leverage
and  higher  returns  to assets. As a result,  their  return  to equitv  is
approximately  six times  as high (3.2  vs. .51  in the  recent  period)  as for the
non conglomerate  establishments.  As the  figures  indicate,  the  highest
increases  in  post-reform  return  to capital  were experienced  by the small  firms
and  large  conglomerates  although  all  medium  firms  continued  to enjoy  the
highest  absolute  returns. These  differences  among  large  firms  are also
reflected  in the  differential  rates  of capital  expansion  through  investment
which  quite  closely  parallels  the  rates  of profitability.  It is  worth noting
that these  results  are robust  to the  denominator  chosen  (capital  or own
equity).
Before  1984,  small  establishments  - those  that  we hypothesize  were more
likely  to face  financial  constraints  - indeed  had leverage  ratios  (defined  as
the  ratio  of stock  of debt to stock  of capital)  much lower  than  did the  medium
and large  firms.  Small  firms  are characterized  by relatively  volatile  earnings
as well as a lack  of access  to formal  credit  markets,  and therefore  are likely
to  pay  higher  interest-rates  in financially  repressed  economies.9 This
hypotheses  is confirmed  for the  small  firms  in the  sample  which  have the
highest  average  nominal  cost of debt,  defined  as total  interest  payment
divided  by the  stock  of debt.  The large  cost  of debt (0.26)  compare  to the
average  bank lending  rate (0.17)  is  probably  the  sign  of the  high share  credit
obtained  in the informal  credit  markets.
What happened  after  1984?  The data indicate  that  the  elimination  of
controls  on many types  of interest-rates  had indeed  increased  the  average  cost
of debt,  as many other  empirical studies  have found.  Small  firms  suffered
most, followed  by the large  firm,  then the  medium  firms  which experienced  the
smallest  increase.  What is most striking  is that,  despite  the increase  in
interest-rate,  small  firms  have  been able to  nearly  double  their  leverage  from
.103  to .202.  This  may suggest  that small  firms  were  more rationed  before
liberalization.  Medium  firms  did  not  experience  a large  increase  in the  cost
9This reflects  the  conventional  wisdom  - e.g. Fry (1988). We have  not
yet analyzed  systematically  the  volatility  of earnings  in this  sample  but
intend  to in future  research.
-19-of 1-orrowing  but had to reduce  their  leverage  from 0.720  to 0.645,  while  large
firms  still  increased  their  degree  of leverage  from  0.337  to 0.438.  Reduction
of the  availability  of subsidized  credits  and changes  in  swap  policy  were
plausibly  the  main reasons  for  the  decrease  of leverage  of medium  firms,  as
will be discussed  later.
TABLE 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS  FOR  FIRMS  DIVIDED  BY SIZE, PERIOD
AND GROUP:  1981-1988
Number
Group  Size  of  Period  I/K  S/K  P/K  S/Eq  D/K  i/D  Y/K
Firms
Non-Conglom
Small  46  81-84  0.070  0.193  0.227  0.215  0.103  0.263  0.900
85-88  0.082  0.432  0.508  0.543  0.203  0:328  1.838
Medium  88  81-84  0.137  0.593  0.727  1.977  0.700  0.170  2.523
85-88  0.118  0.630  0.763  1.775  0.645  0.183  2.673
Large  61  81-84  0.060  0.278  0.313  0.403  0.310  0.130  0.757
85-88  0.065  0.305  0.355  0.510  0.402  0.168  1.123
Conglomerate
Medium  12  81-84  0.143  0.610  0.750  2.864  0.787  0.160  1.587
85-88  0.105  0.650  0.780  1.395  0.534  0.178  2.125
Large  11  81-84  0.080  0.557  0.653  1.653  0.663  0.090  1.917
85-88  0.078  0.758  0.830  2.800  0.765  0.118  2.945
S = operating  surplus  (after  interest,  before  tax and  depreciation)
K = capital  stock  (larnd,  building,  machineies,  equipments  & othersi,  at
replacement  value
P =  operating  surplus  before  interest
Eq  = capital  stock  minus stock  of debt
I  = gross  physical  Investment
VA  = value-added
Y =  total  sales
i=  interest  payrment
D =  stock  of debt,  not including  trade  credit
By further  dividing  the  establishments  into  conglomerate  and  non-
conglomerate,  we can obtain  a clearer  picture  of the  nature  of the  changes.  As
emphasized  in  Hoshi et.  al (1988),  one  wav to  mitigate  informational  problems
is through  grouping  of  firms,  such  as Keiretsu  in  Japan.  And if the  group  owns
or has a special  network  including  a bank, then  this  will tend  to reduce  the
wedge  between  the  costs  of internal  and external  finance.  As  a consequence
-20-large  establishments  which are  part of conglomerates  tend to  have much higher
debt-to  -equity  and debt-to-capital  ratios  than  do unaffiliated  large
establishments.  Several  studies  of the Indonesian  Economy  (Nasucion  (1982),
Ramli(1988))  have indeed  found  that  the low  interest-rates  and generous  credit
policies  prior  to 1983  made Indonesian  companies  in general  have very  high
debt/equity  ratios.  We find that this  is particularly  true for  all  medium
establishments  and large  ones  belonging  to conglomerates.
TABLE  7: SUMMARY STATISTICS  FOR  FIRMS  DIVIDED  BY MARKET, SIZE &
PERIOD:  1981-1988
Number
MARKET Size  of  Period  I/K  S/K  P/K  S/Eq  D/K  i/D  K/VA
Firms
Non-Export
Small  43  81-84  0.061  0.183  0.213  0.197  0.073  0.290  3.030
85-88  0.078  0.378  0.445  0.454  0.168  0.338  1.700
Medium  76  81-84  0.140  0.640  0.787  2.490  0.743  0.160  1.393
85-88  0.118  0.615  0.755  2.085  0.705  0.170  1.323
Large  46  81-84  0.070  0.387  0.420  0.539  0.283  0.163  2.067
85-88  0.068  0.445  0.493  0.683  0.348  0.160  1.673
Export
Small  12  81-84  0.110  0.560  0.683  0.757  0.260  0.167  1.750
85-88  0.100  0.650  0.750  1.022  0.334  0.270  0.585
Medium  14  81-84  0.110  0.460  0.560  0.885  0.533  0.177  1.817
85-88  0.145  0.690  0.800  1.650  0.448  0.210  1.163
Large  26  81-84  0.053  0.253  0.300  0.442  0.427  0.077  3.573
85-88  0.063  0.290  0.370  0.690  0.580  0.113  2.710
Note:  Export  refers  to establishments  that  produce  for export  markets.
S = operating  surplus  (after  interest,  before  tax and  depreciation)
P =  operating  surplus  plus  interest
Eq  =  capital  stock  - stock  of debt
K =  capital  stock  (land,  building,  machineries,  equipments  & others),  at replacement  value
I  gross  physical  Investment
VA = value-added
i=  interest  payment
0 =  stock  of debt, not  including  trade  credit
Not all  of these  changes  in profitability  of assets,  borrowing,  and
investment  rates  can  be attributed  solely  to the  program  of financial  reform.
-21-As was pointed  out in previous  sections,  much of the impetus  for  the entire
package  of reforms  was to increase  incentives  for  non-oil  exports. These
measures  included  exchange-rate  realignments,  special  categories  (and
interest-rates)  for export  credits,  trade  reforms,  and  changed  administrative
procedures  for  customs  and  ports.  Therefore,  it is  useful  to further
categorize  the  establishments  in  our sample  by export  orientation  and size.
This is done in Table  7 which  reports  the  same  measures  that  appeared  in
Tables  5 and 6.
Among small  establishments  there  is a dramatic  difference  between
exporters  and  non-exporters. In both  periods,  the  exporters  faced  lower
interest-rates,  achieved  higher  leverage  ratios,  and  had much  higher  returns
to assets. The result  is that  return  to own  equity  is quite  high (0.757  pre
reform  rising  to 1.022  post reform  while  the  comparable  figures  for  non-
exporters  are .20  rising  to .45).  On the  other  hand,  among large
establishments,  the lower  interest-rates  and  higher  leverage  do not translate
into  higher  returns  to own  equity  because  of the  considerably  lower  returns  to
capital  for these  units.  Although  both types  of establishments  experienced
higher  interest-rates,  leverage  ratios,  and returns  to  capital  after the
reforms,  the  domestically-oriented  units  continued  to  be more profitable  by
either  measure.
Among  medium  establishments,  the  domestically-oriented  units  perfomed
much  better  prior to reforms  while  the  exporters  improved  their  absolute  and
relative  profitability  after  the reforms. Both groups  faced  higher  interest-
rates  after  reform  and  reduced  their  leverage  ratios. Profitability  of the
units  serving  the  domestic  market  decreased  only slightly  (from  very high
levels)  while  the  exporters  experienced  the  most rapid  increase  in
profitability after  the  reforms  (P/K  rose from .56  to .80  while  while  S/EQ
almost  doubled  from  0.88 to 1.65). Clearly,  the  changes  in fortunes  of these
exporting  firms  owed  more to the  reforms,  which  substantially  increased  the
relative  profitability  of exporting,  than to the financial  reforms  per  se.  The
aggregate  data  on non-oil  export  expansion  confirms  the  response  of Indonesian
industry,  particularly  after 1988.  (Parker  (1991)  pp 12-14  and Hill (1990)).
The  small  exporting  establishments,  which  performed  so well, seem to  have
continued  to enjoy  greater  access  to credit  at lower  rates than  did  non-
exporters  in  both periods  although  it  can  be argued  that increased  access  to
-22-credit  at higher  rates  probably  allowed  previously-constrained  small  exporters
to  expand  and increase  their  profitability.
2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEBT AND PRODUCTION
Finally,  it is interesting  to see  how the  liberalization  affected  the
distribution  of debt across  different  types  of firms  in our sample  and  how the
production  was affected  by the  changing  financial  conditions.  Tables  8, 9  and
10  provide  data on establishments'  shares  of the  stock  of debt,  new debt  and
value-added. The tables  also  show the  different  shares  of the  stock  of
domestic  and foreign  deot  across  different  groups  classified  according  to
size,  organizational,  and  market  orientation  both pre and  post-liberalization.
In organization,  these  tables  parallel  tables  5-7.
TABLE 8: SHARE OF DEBT AND VALUE-ADDED
By Size  & Period
Number
Size  of  Period  TDi/TD  NDi/ND  VAi/VA  DDi/DD  FDi/FD
Firms
Small  46  81-84  0.009  0.013  0.014  0.008  O.C01
85-88  0.014  0.026  0.022  0.015  0.001
Medium  100  81-84  0.395  0.569  0.249  0.383  0.456
85-88  0.356  0.426  0.293  0.325  0.386
Large  72  81-84  0.596  0.418  0.737  0.609  0.543
85-88  0.630  0.548  0.685  0.660  0.613
Note:
TDi/TD  =  share  of total debt of firms of size i to total debt for the period
NDi/ND  =  share  of new debt of firms of size i to total new  debt of the period
VAi/VA  =  share  of value-added  of firms of size i to total value-added  for the period
DDi/DD  =  share  of domestic debt of firms of size i to  total domestic  debt
FDi/FD =  share  of foreign debt of firms of size i to total foreign debt
Column  1 of Table  8 gives  a striking  picture  of how concentrated  the  credit
distribution  is in Indonesia.  Large  firms  represent  one third  of the  sample,  and
ret  around  two-thirds  of the  credit  was chanelled  to them.  However  this is
-23-quite  misleading  and  it  would  be  more  appropriate  to  compare  shares  of  credit
with shares  of  value-added.  In  comparing  columns  1  and  3  of  the  table,  it  is
evident  that  in  the  prereform  period  both  small  and  large  firms  received  smaller
shares  of  credit  relative  to  their  value-added  than  did  medium  firms.  After
reform,  there  was  a  relative  decline  in  the  proportions  going  to  medium  firms
while  both  small  and  large  increased  their  relative  shares.  However,  it  may  be
more  revealing  to  examine  the  relationship  between  new  flows  of  debt  and  value-
added  in  the  two  periods.  Again,  the  relative  increases  by  large  establishments
at  the  expense  of  medium  ones  is  clear,  while  the  ratios  between  value-added  and
new  debt  remain  close  to  unity.  It  is  also  evident  that  large  firms
disproportionately  gained  access  to  offshore  credit  in  the  post-liberalization
period  as  might  have  been  expected,  and  it  is  clear  that  small  establishments
have  virtually  no  access  to  offshore  credits.
TABLE 9:  SHARE OF DEBT AND VALUE-ADDED
By Size, Conglomerate  & Period
Number
Size  Group  of  Period  TDi/TD  NDi/ND  VAi/VA  DDi/DD  FDi/FD
Firms
Small  Non-Congl  46  81-84  0.009  0.013  0.014  0.008  0.001
85-88  0.014  0.026  0.022  0.015  0.001
Medium  Non-Congl  88  81-84  0.306  0.319  0.197  0.274  0.360
85-88  0.270  0.270  0.128  0.226  0.232
Conglomerate  12  81-84  0.089  0.250  0.052  0.109  0.096
85-88  0.086  0.156  0.165  0.099  0.154
Large  Non-Congl  61  81-84  0.443  0.210  0.629  0.394  0.365
85-88  0.478  0.280  0.449  0.417  0.308
Conglomerate  11  81-84  0.153  0.208  0.107  0.215  0.178
85-88  0.152  0.268  0.236  0.243  0.305
Note:
TDi/TO  =  share of total debt of firms of size i to total debt for the period
NDi/ND  =  share of new debt of firms of size i to total new debt of the period
VAi/VA  =  share of  value-added  of firms of size i to total  value-added  for  the period
DOi/DD  =  share of domestic debt of firms  of size i to total domestic  debt
FDi/FD  =  share of foreign  debt of firms  of size i to total foreign  debt
-24-Did these  patterns  apply  both to  the  non-conglomerate  and  conglomerate
establishments?  Table 9 reveals  striking  differences. Since  there  are  no
conglomerate  small  establishments,  the  relevant  differences  are  within  the
medium  and large  categories. The  most dramatic  data in this table  concern  the
large  shift  of share  of value-added  from large  non-conglomerates  to medium
conglomerate  establishments. The increase  is from 5.2%  to 16.5%  for  medium
conglomerates  while large  non-conglomerates  exhibited  a decline  from 62.9%  to
44.9%.  At the same time,  the  share  of new  debt flowing  to  medium  conglomerates
fell from  25%  to 15.6%  while  both categories  of large  establishments  increased
TABLE 10:  SHARE OF DEBT AND VALUE-ADDED
By Size,  Market  & Period
Number
Size  Market  of  Period  TDi/TD  NDi/ND  VAi/VA  DDi/DD  FDi/FD
Firms
Small  Non-Export  43  81-84  0.006  0.009  0.012  0.007  0.000
85-88  0.012  0.015  0.014  0.009  0.000
Export  12  81-84  0.003  0.004  0.002  0.001  0.001
85-88  0.002  0.011  0.008  0.006  0.001
Medium  Non-Export  76  81-84  0.330  0.468  0.187  0.176  0.120
85-88  0.290  0.308  0.206  0.126  0.039
Export  14  81-84  0.065  0.101  0.062  0.207  0.336
85-88  0.066  0.118  0.087  0.199  0.347
Large  Non-Export  46  81-84  0.243  0.107  0.367  0.287  0.263
85-88  0.203  0.172  0.349  0.255  0.271
Export  26  81-84  0.353  0.311  0.370  0.322  0.280
85-88  0.427  0.375  0.336  0.405  0.342
Note:
TDi/TD =  share  of total debt of firms of size i to total debt for the period
NDi/ND =  share  of new debt of firms of size  i to total new debt of the period
VAi/VA =  share  of value-added  of firms of size  i to total value-added  for the period
DDi/DD =  share  of domestic debt of firms of size i to  total domestic  debt
FDi/FD  =  share of foreign debt of firms of size i to total foreign  debt
their  shares. Looking  back  at Table  7, it is curious  that the  medium
conglomerates  actuallv  reduced  their  proportional  investment  rates.  Certainly,
-25-their  high and  expanded  profit  and cash flow  rates,  allowed  them to expand  while
reducing  their  leverage  ratios  through  self financing.
Another feature  that  is surprising  is the  much smaller  participation  of
conglomerates  in off-shore  borrowing  despite  the increasing  cost  advantage  of
doing  so.  One  possible  reason  for this  apparent  anomaly  may  be that  borrowing,
both domestic  and abroad,  is done  by the  conglomerate  group  and is not  reported
as debt incurred  by the individual  establishment. Therefore,  the transfer  of
such  borrowed  funds  to the  operating  units  may  be disguised  as self finance,  but
further  research  is  needed  to  understand  better  these  changing  patterns  of
finance  at the level  of the firms  rather  than the  establishment.
Table 10  contains  the  same data  organized  by size  of firm  and export
orientation.  The most surprising  feature  is the small  increase  in the share  of
value-added  contributed  by medium  exporters  - it rose  only from  6.2% to 7.7%
between  the  periods.  In fact there  was a slight  overall  decline  in ithe  share  of
value-added  by exporters  from  43.4%  to 43.1%  between  these  periods.  (The  share
of exporters  must certainly  have increased  sharply  after 1988,  but unfortunately
our  data do not  yet extend  that far.  Parker  (1991)). The relatively  constant
ratios  of new  debt to value-added  of exporters  is fairly  striking  while  the
dominant  allocation  of new  debt to  medium  non-exporters  pre-liberalization  and
its  relative  decline  in the  later  period  is of interest. Finally,  as one  might
expect,  the  ratio  between  foreign-borrowing  and  value-added  is  high for  the
exporting  firms,  although  the  ratio  is also  relatively  high for the  large  non-
exporters.
These tables  shed  more detailed  light  on the  patterns  of credit-allocation
among  establishments  with different  characteristics,  but in general  are
consistent  with the  observations  we obtained  from  the first  set  of tables.
Up to this  point,  the  analysis  on real and  financial  indicators  for  our
panel  of manufacturing  establishments  can  be summarized  as follows.  For small
establishments,  the  economic  reform  had a positive  effect  on their  overall
performance.  And indeed,  liberalization  has helped  to redistribute  credit  toward
small firms. Moreover,  some firms  benefited  by substituting  the  more expensive
domestic  credit  with cheaper  foreign  credit  (sometimes  using  the  swap facility).
These  are the  firms  which  were unlikely  to face informational  asymmetries,
namely  large  conglomerates  that  own banks  and enjoy  direct  relations  with the
off-shore  Singapore  or Hongkong  credit  markets.  Medium  firms  may  have been
severely  affected  by the  liberalization,  and  so their  share  of new debt
-26-decreased.  However,  one  must  be cautious  about  this  conclusion. Medium  firms
were already  highly  leveraged  and  were enjoying  large  cash flows  in the later
period. It  may also  have  been rational  decisions  by entrepreneurs  to reduce  the
risk  of high leverage  although  the  evidence  is incontrovertible  that  returns  to
own  equity  were extremely  high as a result  of leverage. The interplay  between
bank's  prudential  behavior  and  the  demands  for credit  by highly  profitable  and
rapidly-expanding  medium-sized  firms  cannot  be fully  analyzed  at this  point.
However,  that  is the  set  of questions  we will turn  to in the  econometric
sections  of this  paper.
However,  the investment  data  suggests  that  both small  and  large
conglomerate  establishments  - those  which increased  their  share  of debt  - were
able  to increase  their  investment  rates.  On the  other  hand, the  reduction  of
medium  firms'  share  of debt  has  been accompanied  by a reduction  in  their
investment  rate  despite  their  absolutely  high rates  of return. Medium
establishments  were also the  ones  which  showed  little  improvement  of their
average  capital  productivity,  while  the  other  firms  nearly  doubled  theirs,
albeit  from  much lower  initial  levels. Therefore,  in the  post-liberalization'
period,  there  was a process  of convergence  of productivity  levels  among  the
various  categories  of establishments,  a feature  that  may suggest  increasing
economy-wide  efficiency  (Cho,  1988).
IV. EFFECTS'OF  FINANCIAL  LIBERALIZATION:
A Preliminary  econometric analysis
Our  basic theoretical  view is that  Indonesian  manufacturing
establishments  increase  their  capital  stock  through  investment  in response  to
potential  profit-earning  opportunities. Desired  investment  can  be financed  in a
number  of ways,  with borrowing  from  credit  markets  and retention  of cash flow
(internal  finance)  the  two  most important  sources  for  expansion  of existing
firms. If capital-markets  are  perfect  and taxes  are  absent,  firms  finance
investment  to the  point  that  the  marginal  cost (or  opportunity  cost)  of finance
is  equalized  from all  sources  and  are in turn  equated  with the  exDected  marginal
return  to investment. In such  a world,  only the constant  marginal  cost  of funds
and  rate  of return  to investment  are important  for the  investment  decision  and
the  former  should  be closely  related  to the  risk-free  market  interest-rate.
-27-However,  even in  perfect  markets,  there  will be constraints  to  borrowing  as
a result  of asymetric  information,  monitoring  costs,  and potential  moral  hazard,
which  make fixed-interest-rate  lenders  willing  to lend  a higher  proportion  of
the  costs  of proposed  investments  only at increasing  interest  in order  premia  to
compensate  for increased  risk.  This is referred  to in the  literature  as agency
costs. Therefore,  we expect  there  to be increasing  divergence  between  average
and  marginal  interest-rates  for  individual  borrowers  firms  as the  degree  of
financial  leverage  increases. 10
If  markets  are segmented,  so that  some classes  of firms  have limited  access
to borrowing,  they  will be forced  to rely  on internally-generated  funds  and  may
have to forego  some desired  investment  because  of financial  constraints. In
such  cases  we expect  levels  of investment  to  be positively  related  to measures
of cash flow.
In carrying  out an empirical  investigation  of the importance  af market
segmentation,  it is  natural  to estimate  investment  levels  as determined  by
expected  profitibility,  risk-free  markei  rates  of interest,  and  by the  degree  of
financial  leverage. The first  should  have a positive  effect  and  the other  two  a
negative  effect  on the  level  of investment. If, in  addition,  a  measure  of cash
flow  has a positive  effect  on investment,  it  suggests  the  existence  of
constrained  access  to credit  markets  - otherwise  firms  would  borrow  as much as
needed  to maximize  profits  and cash  flow  would  not be constraining. However,
there  is one  major  problem  with this  approach  in that  current  cash flow is
highly  correlated  with current  profit  rates  which in turn  are likely  to be
positively  associated  with expected  future  profits.  Thus it is difficult  to
disentangle  the  effects  of liquidity  constraints  on investment  from those
arising  from  anticipated  profits.
We conduct  our empirical  analysis  by estimating  an unrestricted  investment
equation  of the  general  accelerator  type,  to  which  we have added  cash flow,
St/Kt_,,  and the leverage  ratio,  Dt- 1/Kt_ 1,  as additional  regressors.
lOThis  view is consistent  with the  framework  articulated  by (Gertler  and
Rose,  1991).
-28-The general  specification  for  our regression  equation  is:
(1)  Ii,t/Ki,t_l  - ao +  a1 (Ii,t_l/Ki.t-2)  +  a 2 (AYi,t/Kit_.l)
+  a3 (Si,t/Ki,t_-)  + c4 (Di,t-l/Ki,t_l)  + mt
where  vi,t  - (i,t  +  Ai +t
Ai is  a time invariant  firm  specific  effect  and  qt is a common  time
effect. The  equations  have been estimated  in first  differences  in order  to
control  for  the  firm specific  effects  and the  Generalized  Method  of moments  has
been used to allow  for the  potential  endogeneity  of the  regressors  (See  Arellano
and  Bond,  1991).1l Appropriately  lagged  values  of the  included  variables  are
used  as instruments  (see  Table 11 footnotes).  The inclusion  of the  output  term
is  meant to capture  the  expected  change  in  demand  for the  firm's  product.  Cash
flow  acts as a measure  of a firm's  liquidity  and of its  ability  to finance
investment  internally.  The debt-to-capital  ratio  is included  because  it is
likely  that  the  cost of outside  finance  is positively  correlated  with the  degree
of  leverage,  an effect  referred  to in the  literature  as "agency  cost."  The
equation  was initially  estimated  for  the  whole  sample  of 218  firms,  assuming
that the  slope  coefficients  are the  same for  all firms.  We have also included
year and industry  dummies.  The  year dummies  might capture,  among  other  factors,
changes  in the  risk  free interest-rate.
In an attempt  to investigate  the  effects  of differential  access  to
external  finance,  we then allow  the  slope  coefficients  on cash flow  and the
debt-to-capital  ratio  to  differ  across  groups  of firms  with different
characteristics  (small  and large  firms,  for  the time  being).12 In order  to
examine  the  effects  of liberalization  we also  allow  the  coefficients  to  differ
before  and  after  liberalization.  The results  of several  regressions  are
presented  in  Table 11  below.
lThe  program  DPD (dynamic  panel  data)  has been  used in the  estimation
(see  Arellano  and Bond,  1988).  It is important  to note that  by using  this
procedure,  effects  of changes  in the  basic  risk-free  interest  rate  are
captured,  along  with all other  variables  that  vary over time in the same  way
for  all firms,  by the  year-specific  dummy  variables.
12See  Fazzari  et.al  (1988),  Devereux  and  Schiantarelli  (1989),  Hoshi
(1989)  et.al,  and  Blundell  et.al,  for  evidence  on the  differential  affect  of
cash  flow in developed  countries;  and  Tybout  (1988)  and  Nabi (1983)  for  the
same  evidence  from  developing  countries.
-29-Table 11:  INVESTMENT  EQUATION  r
Size,Group  and liberalization  effects
Dependent  Variable:  Equation  1  Equation  2  Equation  3  Equation  4
It/Kt_l
it_,/Kt-2  - 0.018  0.018  0.017  0.002
(2.171)  (2.295)  (2.082)  (1.214)
Ayt/Kt_l  0.059  0.021  0.055  0.086





St/Kt_l  small  0.519  0.897  0.858
(3.212)  (4.542)  J3.697)
DumSt/Kt_l  small  - 0.508  -0.406
(2.361)  (2.539)
St/Kt_l  large  0.013  0.075  0.057
(3.586)  (1.792)  (1.850)
DumSt/Kt_l  large  - 0.012  0.039
(0.286)  (2.830)
Dt_ 1 /Kt_l  small  - 0.018  - 0.204  -0.142
(1.807)  (2.806)  (1.528)
DumDt_,/Kt_l  small  0.218  0.091
(2.727)  (3.583)
Dt_./Kt_l  large  0.201  0.189
(2.706)  (4,758)
DumDt_./Kt_l  large  0.0001
(0.009)
Dt-./Kt. 1large,  non-conglomerate  -0.056
(2.985)
DumDt_./Kt_l  large,  non-conglomerate  -0.016
(1.407)
Dt_./Kt_l  large  & conglomerate  0.258
(2.202)
DumDt_./Kt_l  large  & conglomerate  0.018
(0.436)
Ml  - 3.864  - 3.234  - 4.224  - 2.566
M2  - 0.609  - 0.007  - 0.752  - 0.015
Sargan  test  32.659  28.075  35.426  56.241
(23)  (33)  (32)  (48)
1. Instruments:  Year  dummies  1985 through  1988 (not  reponed)  and  constants.  Eq  1: gmm(lI/K)-2.gmm(6Y/K)-2.
gmm(SIK)-2.gmnn(D/K)-2,dumSize-2.  Eq  2 & 3: gmm(IIKI-2,gmm(6Y/KI-2,gmm(Ss/K).2.gmm(S/K)-.2,
gmm(Da/K)-2,gmm(DIIK)-2,dumSize-2.  Eq  4: gmm(ItKI-2.gmm(NY/K)-2,gmm(Sa/K)-2,gmm(Da/K)-2,
gmm(S/IKI.3.gmm(DnI/K).2.gmm(DI/K)-2,dumSize-2,dumCongl-2.
2.  t-statistics  appear  in parentheses.
3.  MI  - test  for first  order  serial  correlation,  n(O.1)
4.  M2  - tost for second  order serial correlation,  n(0,1)
5.  Sargan  test. distributed  X  (p)
-30-The regression  reported  in the  first  column  of Table 11  examines  whether
the  cash flow  and debt  variables  have significant  effects  on investment  when the
equality  of slope  coefficients  is imposed  across  firms  and  over time.  The large
positive  and  significant  coefficient  of the  cash flow  variable  suggests  that
cash  flow strongly  affects  investment,  a result  which is consistent  with the
existence  of a financing  hierarchy.  However  the  sign  of the  coefficient  on the
debt-to-capital  ratio  is  positive,  contrary  to what one  would  expect  based  on
agency-cost  arguments  in  the  presence  of asymmetric  information. The source  of
this  positive  sign is explored  in detail  below.
Column  2 of Table  11 presents  the  estimated  equation  we obtain  if  we allow
the  effect  of cash flow  and  debt to differ  between  small  firms (employment  less
than  100)  and larger  firms  (employment  more than 100).13 The results  support
the  notion  that  investment  behavior  differs  substantially  across  different
categories  of firms.  The small  firms  appear  to rely  more on internai  funds  as
shown  by the larger  and significant  cash flow coefficient,  a result  which  is
consistent  with the  view that  small  firms  are liquidity  constrained.
The lack  of access  to credit  and  a large  premium  to  external  finance  due to
asymmetric  information  appears  to describe  well the  situation  faced  by small
firms,  whose  coefficient  of the  debt-to-capital  ratio  is negative  and
significant.  The  cash flow  coefficient  for  larger  firms  is small  and
insignificant,  a strong  indication  that internal  funds  are less important  for
larger  firms.  Note  also that the  debt-to-capital  ratio  coefficient  is  positive
and significant  for larger  firms,  contrary  to  what one  would  expect.  This seems
to suggest  that  for larger  firms,  having  a higher  degree  of leverage  increases
their  ability  to raise  external  funds.  Having  obtained  debt  in the  past  may act
as signal  to financial  intermediaries  of firms'  credit  worthiness.  We discuss
this issue  in  greater  detail  below.
If  we analyze  further  how firms'  behavior  has  been affected  by financial
deregulation  in 1983,  the  story  becomes  even  more interesting.  Column  3 of table
11 displays  the  estimates  of the  effects  of financial  reform  for  different
categories  of firms.  The  variable  of DumSt/Kt_l  is  zero pre-liberalization  and
equal  to St/Kt_l  post-liberalization.  Its  coefficient  therefore  reflects  the
change  in the  importance  of cash  flow relative  to the  pre-liberalization  period.
13We decided  to classify  the  firms  in only two  size  categories  because  a
three  way split  was making  the  equation  too  complex,  given  the  small  number  of
observations  in each cell.
-31-The same  applies  to the  DumDt_l/Kt_l  variable.
Pre-liberalization,  the  extremely  large  and  positive  cash flow
coefficient  for  the small  firms  supports  the  hypothesis  that they  depended  more
Table  12:  INVESTMENT EQUATION:
Size,Group  and liberalization effects






St/Kt_l  small  0.141
(2.625)
DumSt/Kt_l  small  0.074
(0.507)
St/Kt_l  large  0.003
(0.078)
DumSt/Kt_l  large  0.075
(3.528)
(Pt+l/Kt)  small  0.242
(4.096)
(DumPt+ 1/Kt) small  0.077
(0.941)
(Pt+ 1/Kt) large  0.517
(4.656)
(DumPt+ 1/K.) large  -0.192
(2.196)
Dt-,/Kt-,  small  -0.092
(2.541)
DumDt_./Kt_l  small  0.097
(1.914)
Dt_./Kt_l  large  0.165
(2.336)
DumDt_ 1/Kt_l large  -0.026
(0.743)
Ml  - 2.594
M2  - 1.396
Sargan  test  30.464
(34)
1. Ust of instruments: constant. gmm(l/K), gmml6Y/K).  gmm(S/K)sma//,  gmm(S/K)Iarge,  gmm(DOKJmaIl,  gmm(O/K)1a&rff,
gmm(PIKMmeIl,  gmm(P/K)Iaige.  Size  dummies, all lagged  twice; and vear dummies 1985 through 1988 (not reported).
2. t-statistics appeer  in parentheses.
3. S = cash-flow net of interest payments
4. P = operating  profits
5. Ml  =  test for first order serial correlation,  distributed nMO,1M
6. M2  =  test for second  order serial  correlation,  distributed n(O.  1)
7. Sargan  test, distributed i(p)
-32-heavily  on internal  funds  to finance  their  investment.  They  were also facing
an increasing  cost of external  funds  as their  leverage  was increasing,  as
suggested  by the  negative  sign  of the  leverage  coefficient.  After
liberalization,  small firms  relaxed  their  dependence  on internal  funds.  The
cash-flow  coefficient  decreases  significantly  from  0.897  to 0.389.  The
coefficient  of the debt-to-capital  ratio,  instead,  declines  almost  to zero for
the  post-liberalization  period.  On the  other  hand, liberalization  does  not
seem  to have similar  effects  on large  firms'  financing  behavior.  rhe
coefficient  of cash-flow  is small  and insignificant  pre-liberalization  and
remains  so afterwards. The  debt-to-capital  coefficient  is positive  and  does
not change  between  the  two  periods  for these  large  establishments.
In order  to  better  undestand  why the  coefficient  on the  degree  of
leverage  is positive  for  larger  firms,  we allow  it to differ  between  larger
firms  that  belong  to a conglomerate  group  and those  which  do not (rn6ne  of the
small  firms  belongs  to  a conglomerate).  In  column  4 of Table 11,  as we would
expect  in a world  of asymmetric  information,  the leverage  coefficient  is
negative  and  significant  for larger  individual  firms.  It is,  however,  positive
and  significant  for  larger  firms  which  are  parts  of conglomerates.  It is
unclear  whether  the  degree  of leverage  reported  for  an individual  subsidiary
unit  of a conglomerate  should  indeed  increase  the  cost  of borrowing  since
assignment  of a particular  liability  to a specific  unit is arbitrary  and
should  be recognized  as such  by lenders.
One could  argue  that the  cash flow  variable  captures  not only liquidity
considerations,  but also  prospects  for future  profits. For this  reason,  in
regression  5 in Table  12  we have included  as an additional  regressor,  the
future  value of operating  profits  relative  to the  capital  stock,  a
specification  which implicitly  assumes  that  agents  hold rational  expectations.
The equation  has again  been estimated  in first  differences,  using  the  GMH
method  with appropriately  lagged  values  of the  variables  as instruments.
Furthermore,  since  future  profit  rates  and current  cash-flow  rates  are  not
perfectely  correlated,  the  specification  may allow  us to distinguish  between
the two  effects  embodied  in the  cash-flow  variable  when it is  used alone.  In
this  specification,  after  controlling  for future  profit,  the  cash flow
variable  is  more nearly  a  measure  of liquidity  and  should  enter  only for  firms
with constrained  access  to credit  markets. However,  since  the  current  cash
flow  and future  profitability  variables  are  significantly  positively
-33-correlated,  we cannot  be too  certain  about the  statistical  precision  with
which the  two  effects  have been disentangled.
Under  this specification,  it remains  true  that  cash flow is significant
only for  small  firms.  However,  its  coefficient  is now smaller  (0.141),  and it
does  not change  significantly  after  liberalization.  For large  firms  the
coefficient  is not significant  before  liberalization.  It  become  significant
afterwards,  but it remains  rather  small (0.078).
The response  to future  profit  is extremely  high for large  firms  in the
first  period  (0.517),  but it decreases  significantly  after  reforms.  For small
firms  the  coefficient  of future  profit  is approximately  half the size (0.242)
of the  one for large  firms,  and it increases,  although  not significantly,
after  liberalization.In  the  latter  period,  the  coefficient  of future  profit
for  both large  and small  firms  is  approximately  equal  to 0.3.
The substantial  variability  of these  coefficients  under  alternative
specifications,  reminds  us that these  variables  are  highly  collinear  and  are
probably  not estimated  with utmost  precision. Nevertheless,  they  seem to
contain  information  and are  not grossly  inconsistent  with the  findings  from
the  earlier  equations.  The fact that  small  firms  were less responsive  than
large  firms  to future  profits  in the  earlier  period ,  while  their  behavior  is
quite  similar  after  reforms,  is consistent  with relaxation  of financial
constraints  on small  firms  and reduction  in the  degree  of market  segmentation
after  liberalization.
V. CONCLUSION
What general  conclusion  can  we draw at this  stage  about the  effects  of
financial  liberalization  on Indonesian  firms? The overall  impression  one
obtains  from  the  analysis  of the  real  and financial  indicators  for  the
establishments  in  our  panel is that the  economic  reforms  had a favorable
effect  on the  performance  of smaller  firms. On the  financial  side,
liberalization  has helped  to reallocate  domestic  credit  towards  small firms  to
a level  roughly  proportional  with their  contribution  to  value-added.
Moreover,  other  firms  were successful  in  substituting  the  more expensive
domestic  credit  with cheaper  foreign  credit,  thereby  releasing  some  domestic
credit  to  establishments  lacking  such  access. Although  nominal  and real
-34-interest-rates  have risen  to  very high levels,  real  returns  to capital  assets
remain  high and  have increased  substantially  for small  and  medium  exporting
establishments.  For all  groups,  higher  rates  of financial  leverage  have  given
rise to  extremely  high returns  to  owned  equity. Medium-sized  firms,  both
conglomerate  and  non conglomerate,  have  had the  higest  rates  of returns  to
capital,  financial  leverage,  and returns  to equity. However,  after
liberalization  these  highly  profitable  firms  suffered  a drop in their  share  of
new credits  and  reduced  slightly  their  rate  of investment. However,  one  m-ast
be cautious  in inferring  causality  since  the  rates  of cash flow  remained  high
relative  to the  rate of investment  and it is  possible  that  many of these  firms
grew through  formation  of new establishments  in addition  to expanding  existing
units.
The econometric  results  obtained  from  the estimation  of investment
equations,  also  suggest  that in the  pre-liberalization  period  smali  firms  were
facing  capital-market  imperfections  in the  form  of liquidity  constraints
and/or  a rising  cost  of external  funds  schedule  and that  such financial
constraints  were somewhat  relaxed  after  liberalization.  The cash-flow
variable  became  less important  and the  premium  on external  finance  appears  to
have  decreased.  When future  profits  are included  as an additional  explanatory
variable,  the  coefficient  for  cash  flow decreases  in size,  as one  would
expect.  However,  it remains  significant  for  small  firms.  Large  firms  are  more
responsive  to future  profits  before  liberalization,  but the  response  of firms
of all  sizes  becones  quite  similar  after  financial  reform.
All these  results  should  be treated  with caution  and a few caveats  are in
order. Our sample  of firms is  not  a representative  one  and care  must  be taken
in  extending  the  conclusion  to the  entire  population  of Indonesian
manufacturers. Moreover,  financial  liberalization  is  an ongoing  process  that
accelerated  at the  end  of the  80's  and, given  the  time  dimension  of our  panel,
we are  not able to evaluate  the  effects  of these  most recent  developments.
More  definite  conclusions  may be reached  when investigators  have access  to
data  covering  a longer  period  after  the implementation  of reform  measures  of
late  1988,  but this  will have to  be left  for future  research.
However,  the  conclusions  that  can  be drawn from  our  preliminary
investigation  is that financial  reforms  have  had a significant  impact  on
firms'  real  and financial  choices. The process  of shifting  from
administrative  allocations  of credit  towards  market-based  allocations  has
-35-increased  borrowing  costs,  particularly  for  smaller  firms  but,  at  the  same
time,  widened  access  and  finance.  The  net  effect  appears  to  have  been
positive  from  the  standpoint  of  investment  and  rates  of  profit.  These  data
suggest  that  the  degree  of  market  segmentation  has  been  diminished  by  reform.
-36-APPENDIX:  DATA CONSTRUCTION
1. Data construction.
The data  were taken  from the  Annual  Survey  on Manufacturing
Establishments  conducted  by the  Central  Bureau  of Statistics  since  1975. An
additional  data set  which  proved  itself  very useful  because  it contained  data
on capital  stocks  and  exports  was the  1986  Census  of Manufacturing
Establishments.  The  number  of establishments  in the  annual  survey  varied  from
8300  establishments  in 1975  to  around  14,000  in 1988,  and 5830  establishments
with complete  capital  stock  data in the  1986  census.
We have selected  a sample  of firms  from  the two  sources  as follows.  Prior
to 1981,  data  on financial  sources  was  not available.  For this reason  we will
only  use a sample  period  which  runs from  1981-1988. The 1981-1988  survey  data
has 4,400  firms  with complete  data for  at least  three  sequential  years  of
output,  and  the  census  data  covers  5,430  firms. Merging  the 1981-1988  survey
with the  1986  census,  left 2,229  firms  with observations  in  both data  sets.
WIe  then  constructed  capital  stock  estimates  by backcasting  and forecasting  the
capital  stocks,  using  the  capital  stock  from  the 1986  data  as a benchmark  (see
below for  details). Deleting  establishments  that  had estimated  negative  or
zero  capital  stocks,  we were left  with 1992  establishments  that  were
continuously  producing  output  throughout  the  sample  period.  Furthermore,  we
deleted  all  observations  with non-positive  figures  for investment  purchases;
and  we kept  only those  firms  that  have at least  three  sequential  years  of
positive  investment.
#  of years  #  of observations  of establishments
3  1614  538
4  408  102
5  325  65
6  486  81
7  182  26
8  1992  249
A very large  number  of firms  report  zero investment  in  many years.  We are
unable  at this  time to  determine  whether  reporting  of zero investment  is in
fact  a non-response  or if it represents  a real  observation  of very low
investment.  Since  there  are  econometric-problems  associated  with estimating
-37-panel-based  investment  functions  with observations  of zero investment,  we have
chosen  for this  preliminary  analysis  to include  observations  2nly  if the
Investment  level  is positive.  By following  this  practice,  we are left  with
unbalanced  panel  of 1061  establishments  which  has the  following  structure:
2. Capital  Stock  Construction.
The following  explains  how  we constructed  the  real  capital  stock  variable
based  on 1986  prices.  We were quite  fortunate  that  the 1986  census  data
provide  the  replacement  value of capital  stock.  We then  use the  data  on annual
investment  purchases,  It,  obtained  from the  annual  survey  and use an
investment-goods  deflator  to convert  the investment  to a real level  based  on
constant  1986  prices. We then calculate  the  estimated  capital  stock  for  the
rest  of the  period  using the  perpetual  inventory  method.  Our task  was
simplified  because  both sources  have the  data  broken-down  into  five&components
- land,  building,  machinery,  vehicles  and  other  capital  goods.  The  main
advantage  of this  breakdown  is that  it enables  us to assign  different  physical
depreciation  rates  to each asset  type  while  constructing  the  capital  stock
estimates. The total  capital  stock  datum  used in our  analysis  is the
summation  of those  five  variables,  net of assets  sold  during  the  period,  ISt.
For  each type  of asset,  capital  stock  estimates  was constructed  by the
perpetual  inventory  method,  where:
Kit  - iit-l  +  (l-6i)*Kit_l  - ISit
where  i is the  ith  type  of capital  good  and t is the time  period.  In choosing
the  real depreciation  rates  to be used,(6j),  we made use of information  from
an informal  survey  we conducted  in 1900.  On the  basis  of the information
collected  we have assumed  that  buildings depreciate  by 0.033  annually,
machinery  by 0.10,  vehicles  by 0.20,  and other  equipments  by 0.20.  Land  was
not  depreciated. Aggregating  across  the  i types  of capital  goods.  we obtain
the  establishment-specific  capital  stock  measure  Kt - Z  K
tI3  it'
This  method  of back casting  and  forecasting  the  capital  stock  had one
important  weakness  in that  it is  possible  to  estimate  a negative  capital  stock
value  whenever  the investment  at that  particular  year is  much larger  than  the
previously-estimated  capital  stock.  We have eliminated  all firms in  which  the
capital  stock  estimate  becomes  negative  in any  year since  that is  a physical
-38-impossibility  and  can arise  only from  data errors  or gross  deviation  of
estimated  firm actual  physical  depreciation  rates.
3.  Stock  of Debt Variable
This preliminary  report  will only  make  use of the  balanced  panel  of 249
establishments  for the  1981-1988  period.  The first  step  we took  to get
reasonable  sample  values,  was to  check  for  outliers.  We found  that some  firms
reported  extremely  low  or  high capital  to  value-added  ratios.  We believe  that
a K/VA ratio  of less than  0.30  or more than 6.00 is a sign  of misreported  or
mismeasured  Capital  or value-added.  By only  keeping  firms  with K/VA  of 0.30  to
6.00 in the  sample,  we are left  with 218  establishments  to work  with.
In the  construction  of the  debt  variable  we have again  used the
information  collected  in our  1990 informal  survey. This suggested  that  most
of the firms  replied  to the  question  concerning  the flow  of new  debt for  a
certain  year,  by giving  the  figure  for  the  stock  of debt outstanding,  which
was in fact  easier  to find  in their  balance  sheet.  Moreover,  by checking  the
debt-to-capital  ratio,  interest  to debt ratio,  interest  to  value-added  ratio
and capital  to value-added  ratio,  we concluded  that indeed  it  was very likely
that  most of the  establishments  provided  stock  instead  of flow  measures  of
debt.  Moreover,  on the  basis  of these  ratios  it  was possible  to identify  firms
which  in fact  provided  data  on flow  of debt in any  year.  And for these
observations  we converted  this  flow  data to stock  of debt  by cumulating  the
flows.
Finally,  approximately  20%  of the  establishments  did  not  provide  the
debt figures  although  they  almost  always  provided  data  on interest  payments.
Again from  the informal  survey  we conducted,  we found  that  some  multi-plant
establishments  did  not  have the  debt figures  in their  book-keeping  although
they  did  have the  interest  payments,  mainly  because  all loans  were handled  by
the  head office  while the  interest  payments  are  charged  to  establishments.  To
obtain  an estimate  of the  stock  of debt for  these  establishments,  we first  had
to  decide  which interest  rate  should  be used to impute  the level  of debt.
Considering  that the  average  annual  interest  rates  range  from 5% for  priority
sector  to as high as 45%  in the informal  credit  market,  we decided  to
calculate  the  median  interest  rate  of firms  reporting  interest  rates  within
that  range,  calculated  yearly  for  different  sizes  of firms.  We then  use this
median  rate to impute  the  debt levels  for  those  years  in which  the  debt figure
was  missing,  but interest  payments  were  .reported.  Finally,  for  the firms  that
-39-have an interest  to debt ratio  outside  the  0.050  - 0.450  range,  we used
interest  payments  and the  median  rates  in their  year-size  class  to impute  the
debt figure.
4. Number  of firms in  the  unbalanced  and balanced  panel
After going through  all the three  steps  described  above,  we are left  we
a set  of 1061 firms  in the  unbalanced  panel  with at least  three  years  of
complete  information,  and 218  firms  in the  balanced  panel  with eight  vears  of
complete  data.  The following  table  is  presented  to show the  distribution  of
the  balanced  panel across  different  categories.





Small  46  20.7
Medium  100  46.1
Large  72  33.2
2.  BY GROUP
Non-Conglomerate  194  89.4
Conglomerate  24  10.6
3. BY  AGE
Young  117  53.9
Old  65  30.0
Very old  36  16.1
4. BY  MARKET
Non-Export  166  76.0
Export  52  24.0
5. BY STATUS
Domestic  170  78.3
Foreign/Joint  Venture  48  21.7
6. BY TYPE
Private  184  84.3
Public  Enterprise  34  15.7
Note:
1. Small (<100  workers), Medium  (100-<500wo:kers). Large (>500  workers)
2. Non-conglomerate  refers to individual  establishments
3. Age refers to year  start of production.  Young (>1975),  Old (1965-1975), Very Old(<1965)
4. Export market refers to firms whose product exported  directlv
5. Domestic  refers to firms with 100% domestic equitV,  foreign/joint-venture  refers to firms with anV  level of foreign
equity participation
6. Private  refers to firms with 100% private (non-government)  equity, while public enterprise  refers to firms with any
level of central or regional  government  equity participation.
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